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**Competition and Control in International Adjudication**

Jacob Katz Cogan

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Competition and Control in International Adjudication

JACOB KATZ COGAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.......................................................................................... 412
I. Consent and Control........................................................................ 418
II. Can International Courts Be Controlled by States? ...................... 419
   A. External Controls on International Courts ................................ 420
   B. Limitations on External Controls............................................. 426
   C. The Limits of External Controls: Inefficiency.......................... 430
III. Can International Courts Exert Self-Control? .............................. 431
   A. Internal Controls on International Courts............................... 432
   B. Limitations on Internal Controls............................................. 434
   C. The Limits of Internal Controls: Moral Hazard........................ 437
IV. Competition and Control.............................................................. 438
   A. Competitive Adjudication...................................................... 440
   B. Limitations on Competitive Adjudication............................... 444
   C. The Limits of Competitive Adjudication: Market Failure.......... 446
V. Conclusion: Coherence and Competition...................................... 446

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Different and more or less conflicting systems of law, different and more or less competing systems of jurisdiction, in one and the same region, are compatible with a high state of civilization, with a strong government, and with an administration of justice well enough liked and sufficiently understood by those who are concerned.1

INTRODUCTION

States are increasingly delegating or transferring powers to international organizations,2 and international organizations are increasingly pushing the limits of the powers conferred upon them. This expansion of powers embraces all areas of international authority—particularly lawmakering and adjudication.3 Recognizing that international organizations have gained this greater role, scholars have begun to think more deeply about the legitimacy, accountability, and good governance of international organizations,4 and States (as well as non-State entities, such

as the European Union and nongovernmental organizations, knowing what is at stake, have become more forthright in seeking a seat at the table.

As the powers of international organizations have expanded, the need to maintain control of international organizations has also grown. "Control" means checks on the powers of an organization that ensure that the organization acts within its assigned mandate. Controls, such as the checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution, are necessary in any system of limited powers. Without them, restrictions, as they appear in an organization's charter, are liable to disappear, and the organization is likely to take actions either in violation of its allocated authority (the claims of *ultra vires* and *excès de pouvoir*) or for a purpose for which that authority was not granted (the claim of *détournement de pouvoir*). Depending on their content, such actions could jeopardize the legitimacy of the organization and, conceivably, its very existence. Controls, therefore, are crucial to the successful operation of an international organization; they have greater importance the greater the power given to the organization. This is true whether the international organization (or one of its components) exercises political, legislative, administrative, or judicial functions.

But control is not everything. International organizations need a certain degree of independence in order to accomplish their tasks, and, indeed, that is assumed by the States that create them. Independence—in the forms of autonomy and neutrality—can "enhanc[e] the efficiency and legitimacy of collective and individual actions." The assumption

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11. Id. at 16; see also Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, *The Independence of Inter-
of independence is particularly true for international courts, which, like their domestic counterparts, require independence as a prerequisite of their legitimacy and the successful fulfillment of their responsibilities.\textsuperscript{12}

A tension between independence and control is inherent in all forms of international delegation, but no more so than with delegation to international courts.\textsuperscript{13} Courts are accorded independence on the condition that there are sufficient effective controls in place, and controls are tailored so as not to impede too greatly on judicial independence. In some highly developed domestic legal systems, such as the United States,\textsuperscript{14} the controls are so finely tuned and trusted that courts are allowed powers, in some instances, to negate the acts of other governmental entities (judicial review of legislative and administrative acts) or to develop the law on their own (common-law-making).\textsuperscript{15} In less developed systems, such as international law, courts do not have such expansive authorities,\textsuperscript{16} but their impact is no less great and their role is no less important.

International law scholars have argued recently that we need not worry about the potential excesses of international courts—and particularly international judicial lawmaking—because existing controls effectively keep courts in check.\textsuperscript{17} Described variously as "bounded discre-


\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Jonas Tallberg, Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?, 25 W. EUR. POL. 23, 28 (2002) ("What truly makes delegation a dilemma is the fact that its very rationale may prevent government principals from establishing effective control mechanisms.").


\textsuperscript{15} Of course, the exercise of such authorities by courts in even the most developed legal systems is controversial in particular cases and is rejected by some categorically.


tion”\textsuperscript{18} or “constrained independence,”\textsuperscript{19} these scholars assert that international courts operate in a “strategic space” in which “the political constraint is operating effectively.”\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, to the extent any judicial lawmaking or innovation has occurred, it has been tacitly approved of by the relevant States, which therefore removes any questions about its legitimacy.\textsuperscript{21}

This Essay takes issue with this assumption that controls on international courts are sufficient and effective. To the contrary, existing controls over international courts are, in practice, relatively weak. Because of structural constraints on international lawmaking and the intricacies of international politics and diplomacy,\textsuperscript{22} States generally lack the ability to correct interpretive errors made by courts, and because of the principle of judicial independence, States are unable to direct judges to decide cases in certain ways or otherwise control the substance of judicial decisions. Judges, for their part, naturally have their own interests and are tempted and encouraged to depart from their limited roles in order to expand their own and their courts’ authorities. Internal controls are, thus, relatively weak as well. This is not to say, certainly, that existing controls do not sometimes work or that judges seldom rule in accordance with law. It is simply to point out that controls are not as effective as they are purported to be.

Because States have no obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of international courts and because States have the ability not to comply with judicial decisions, the weaknesses of judicial controls means that States are more likely to avoid courts, abandon them, or disregard their decisions, potentially condemning courts to irrelevance. In order to preserve and strengthen international courts, we need to think anew about how best to maintain control over them.


18. Ginsburg, supra note 17.


20. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 249.

21. See Danner, supra note 17, at 4.

The answer is not, as some have suggested, for States to exert greater direct control over international judges.\textsuperscript{23} As others have pointed out, international courts with independent judges serve useful purposes for States by, among other things,\textsuperscript{24} "enhanc[ing] the credibility of international commitments,"\textsuperscript{25} thereby ensuring the relevant "[legal] regime's perceived legitimacy and continued operation."\textsuperscript{26} More State control over judges would consequently be counterproductive. The greater the direct control over judges by States the lesser the utility of those judges and their courts to States.

Instead, this Essay argues that the increasing competition among international courts that has resulted from their recent proliferation\textsuperscript{27} has and will continue to more effectively constrain international judicial power and, as a result, increase the likelihood that States will recognize and accede to international judicial authority. Competition among courts may also lead to better—and perhaps convergent—decisions over the long-term. Though some have acknowledged in passing the possible benefits of competition among courts for norm-development,\textsuperscript{28} no one

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\textbf{24. Other reasons for delegating authority to international courts include efficiency, expertise, domestic politics, mimicry, and blame shifting. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 22, at 329; Rachel Brewster, \textit{Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law}, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006); Tallberg, supra note 13, at 26–27. There are also, of course, reasons for not delegating authority to international courts or for limiting such authority. See, e.g., David P. Forsythe, \textit{The International Court of Justice at Fifty, in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS} 385, 398 (A.S. Muller, D. Raïč & J.M. Thurnärszky eds., 1997); Joel P. Trachtman, Book Note, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 855, 858, 860 (2004) (reviewing JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)).}
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\textbf{25. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 904; see also id. at 931–36.}
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\textbf{27. There is, by now, a substantial literature on the proliferation of international courts. In addition to pieces cited elsewhere in this Essay, see also Symposium, \textit{The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piercing Together the Puzzle}, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999); and Symposium, \textit{Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law}, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004).}
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has provided a comprehensive argument in its favor, linked competition with control, or offered a defense against competition’s critics who claim, as Gilbert Guillaume, former judge and president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), recently did, that “[t]he law of the market...cannot be the law of justice.”

Part I explains why effective controls are necessary for international adjudication. Part II argues that States, with minor exceptions, currently do not have effective mechanisms to control international courts once those courts have been established. Part III looks at internal control mechanisms and asks whether judges can effectively control their own interests in expanding the powers of their courts. Part IV contends that the international legal system, as it is presently constituted, is well-suited to competitive adjudication, that such competition can provide an effective judicial control mechanism, and that, on balance, this and other characteristics of competition enhance international dispute resolution. To this end, the Essay concludes with an argument against “system-protective” judicial devices such as inter-court deference, and in favor of the establishment of “competition-friendly” procedures.


30. Martinez, supra note 29, at 448.
I. CONSENT AND CONTROL

International adjudication is still a consent-based system.\textsuperscript{31} States are under no obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of an international court, and even when they do, they reflect the limits of their consent in the terms of the court’s mandate or (if permitted) in the terms of their accession to it.\textsuperscript{32} Such limits can stipulate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction\textsuperscript{33} and any other preconditions on its exercise. The mandates may also limit the court’s procedures, what law the court may apply, and what remedies it may impose.\textsuperscript{34}

Like all organizations with limited mandates, restrictions on international courts would be meaningless without effective control mechanisms. Controls are common in all successful national constitutional systems. The system of checks and balances in the U.S. Constitution is the most obvious example. Controls can be in the original document laying out the institution’s mandate or evolve over time. They can take on a variety of forms. They can be exercised by coequal structures—for example, separate branches of government—or hierarchically, such as by a higher court over a lower court. They can be formal or informal. They can be direct or indirect. They can be internal or external. Internal controls are those exercised by the institution itself. They are, in other words, methods of self-control. External controls, by contrast, are those effected by outside bodies.

\textsuperscript{31} Consent, clearly, is more complicated with regard to the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were founded not on individual State consent but the consent of a group of States by decision of the Security Council. As I discuss below, see infra Section IV.B, the meaning of consent can also be attenuated when international adjudication is an integral component of a larger diplomatic bargain. Even so, the argument, made by some, that international adjudication is moving (or has moved) from a consensual to a compulsory system is, I believe, exaggerated. See, e.g., Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791 (2007).

\textsuperscript{32} This discussion is based in part on REISMAN, supra note 7, at 1–3; and W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and International Adjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 28–37 (1996). See also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 188–236 (2001).


\textsuperscript{34} See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 38.
Not all control systems are created equal though. Some are more targeted than others; some are more effective than others; and some are more desirable than others. Internal controls are more efficient because they eliminate or reduce the costs of correction by external agents, but most legal systems, including international law, contain a complicated and intertwined combination of internal and external controls in order to reduce the risk of control failure and to ensure optimal control effect.

However constructed, controls provide States the comfort they seek at the moment of consent that an international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate, and controls continue to provide States the security they require to maintain their consent throughout a court’s existence. The work controls do, in other words, is not only objective—that is, actually establishing limits to judicial action. It is, and perhaps more importantly, subjective—the creation of the perception that courts are acting in accordance with their mandates. It is that perception that allows a risk-averse State to do what it need not do—consent to a court’s jurisdiction. And the failure to create such an impression (or, alternatively, the undermining of an existing positive impression) helps weaken consent.

Simply stated, without control there would be no consent, and without consent there would be no adjudication. Thus, when controls are removed (or perceived to be removed), consent is likely to go as well. And when controls are weakened, so too is consent. Effective controls are, therefore, necessary for the existence and success of international dispute resolution. It is important, then, to understand whether there are sufficient and effective controls on international courts, and, if not, how they can be improved.

II. CAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS BE CONTROLLED BY STATES?

On the surface there are a multitude of ways for States to control international courts. States elect a court’s judges; they set the court’s budget and appropriate funds; they specify the terms of the court’s jurisdiction and write the laws that the court applies in particular cases; and, if all else fails, they can withdraw from a court’s jurisdiction. The standard view is that these multiple mechanisms of controlling international courts are effective and sufficient.35

35. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 17; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17.
But controlling an international court is not as easy as it looks, for two reasons. First, State control of international courts is limited because courts (and their judges), as an essential component of their existence, are provided judicial independence and because the tools for the control of courts are cumbersome and not easily employed. External controls and their limitations—judicial independence and structural constraints inherent to the international system—are the subjects of this Part. Second, State control is limited because international courts, particularly their judges, are not simple puppets—courts and judges have interests and authorities of their own, interests that occasionally differ from those of the States that established them. This second set of reasons, which pertain to judicial self-control, is the subject of Part III.

A. External Controls on International Courts

External controls on international courts are many and various, encompassing actions both ex ante and ex post. They come in five categories: (1) control over the court’s mandate; (2) control over the rules the court applies; (3) control over the court’s staffing; (4) control over the court’s budget; and (5) control over a court’s ability to make and apply its decisions.

States control a court’s mandate, the basic document that establishes the court and sets the terms of the court’s jurisdiction and operation. Mandate control operates both ex ante and ex post. States, for instance, can limit a court’s jurisdiction ex ante, and if they find that the original jurisdictional grant is flawed, they have the ability to revise the court’s mandate ex post. The Security Council, for instance, has amended a number of times the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in order to enhance the efficiency of the courts by increasing the number of judges available to hear cases and by adding an additional prosecutor. The Council has also set out “completion

36. For a useful summary of various control mechanisms, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 944, tbl. 3.


strategies" for the two ad hoc criminal tribunals, which establish "target dates\(^{39}\) for the conclusion of investigations, trials, and "all [other] work."\(^{40}\) Though the dates specified by the Council are couched in less than binding language, the evident threat is that the courts will be shut down, and their mandates terminated, at the close of the specified period.

States can also try to control a court through the strict drafting of applicable law ex ante, subsequent interpretation of the law, and the formal revision of that law ex post. To this end, most treaties allow for amendment and some provide mechanisms for the parties to adopt authoritative interpretations of the agreement.

The detailed Statute, Elements of Crimes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence set out by the drafters of the Rome Statute and the States Parties to the International Criminal Court demonstrate the lengths to which States can go to limit a court’s discretion ex ante.\(^{41}\) These documents were a deliberate attempt by their drafters to limit judicial discretion through detailed rules (as opposed to standards).\(^{42}\) This move resulted, in part, from concerns that the crimes in the Court’s Statute were too vague, infringing on the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) and allowing for the possibility of judicial lawmaking.\(^{43}\) It also re-

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43. See William K. Lietzau, *International Criminal Law After Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military Perspective*, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 122–23 (2001); see also William K. Lietzau, *Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillars for the International...
flected dissatisfaction with active rulemaking by ICTY and ICTR judges.\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, one former-ICTY judge described the Elements of Crimes as “an overwhelming exercise in legal positivism,”\textsuperscript{45} and concluded that the “drafting of the ICC Statute and of the Elements of Crimes illustrates clearly an intent on [the] part [of the States Parties to the Rome Statute] to maintain control over the making of international law and to keep a tight leash on the ability of international judges to go beyond what [States] have agreed to.”\textsuperscript{46} Another former-ICTY judge and president, referring to the ICC Statute, lamented that it “seems to evince a certain mistrust in the Judges.”\textsuperscript{47}

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an example of ex post rules control. Pursuant to that agreement, the NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission (FTC), whose members are the three NAFTA parties, has the authority to interpret provisions of NAFTA, and the FTC’s interpretations are binding on NAFTA dispute resolution panels.\textsuperscript{48} In fact, such interpretations may effectively “overrule” interpretations given to the same provisions in earlier decisions of dispute resolution panels. In 2001, the Commission did precisely this following three awards interpreting a particular NAFTA provision.\textsuperscript{49} The three

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\textsuperscript{44} Article 51 of the Rome Statute provides that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to be adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. Judges can only adopt provisional rules in “urgent cases,” which will then be reviewed by a subsequent Assembly of States Parties. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, \textit{supra} note 33, art. 51(3).
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\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 61.
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\textsuperscript{49} \textit{See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of (}\textit{\textsuperscript{49}}
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NAFTA parties decided that these interpretations were incorrect, and the FTC issued its own interpretation. The FTC’s interpretation was subsequently followed by panels in *The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States* and *Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada*.

Another technique by which States could possibly control courts is through judicial appointments. Staffing control can take place in a number of ways: through the establishment (or not) of judicial term limits; through the length of the judge’s term of office; through the nomination, election, and reappointment of judges; through the granting of certain privileges and immunities to judges; and through the designation of judicial seats for certain States, regions, or persons with particular competences and experience. Presumably, States put some thought into those who they nominate and elect to the international bench. Further, it is assumed that judges are more likely to do a good job if they wish to be re-appointed and that a judge who does a poor job will not be re-nominated or re-elected.

States might also control courts through their budgets, as courts are entirely dependent on States and international organizations for their funding. The expenses of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, are listed below. These expenses are likely to be influenced by the States that contribute funds to the court.

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54. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 33, art. 36(5) (requiring there to be an “equivalent proportion” of judges with competences in criminal law and procedure and in international humanitarian law and the law of human rights); id. art. 36(8) (stating the parties shall take into account in the selection of judges, inter alia, “[e]quitable geographic representation” and a “fair representation of male and female judges”).

ample, are "borne by voluntary contributions from the international community."\textsuperscript{56} The Presidents of the International Criminal Court and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) depend on their respective States Parties to bear their courts' expenses, in ways decided by their Assemblies of States Parties.\textsuperscript{57} And the Presidents of the ICJ, ICTY, and ICTR go hat in hand to the UN General Assembly at least every other year to garner sufficient funds.\textsuperscript{58} Conceivably, States can signal their displeasure with a court by limiting its funds. Indeed, one scholar has asserted recently that "[k]eeping [the ICJ] on a tight budget looks increasingly like a poorly concealed attempt to influence it."\textsuperscript{59}

The final category of external control is decision control: mechanisms that remove a State from a court's jurisdiction, either ex ante or ex post, or deny the applicability to a State of a court's ruling. Decision control is different from mandate control because it operates at the level of the individual State. Jurisdictional avoidance can occur in three ways: a State may refuse to consent to a court's jurisdiction in whole or in part; a State may take a reservation to a treaty, thereby denying a court the ability to apply the specified rule to that State; and a State, having previously consented to a court's jurisdiction or to a treaty regime, usually may exit. Denial of a court's ruling takes the form of noncompliance.\textsuperscript{60}

There are, of course, many examples of decision control. In 1986, in reaction to rulings by the ICJ, the United States withdrew its blanket


\textsuperscript{57} Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, art. 19; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 33, art. 115.


\textsuperscript{59} Romano, supra note 55, at 286.

\textsuperscript{60} On noncompliance, see Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 Yale J. Int'l L. 189 (2006).
consent to the Court’s jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{61} and in 2005 the United States withdrew from a treaty that gave the Court jurisdiction over disputes pertaining to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.\textsuperscript{62} The United States now generally refuses to consent to any treaty that provides the ICJ with jurisdiction over disputes without having the option to waive such a provision.\textsuperscript{63} But the United States, certainly, is far from the only State that has avoided—partially or entirely—the decisional authority of international courts or failed to comply with a court’s ruling.\textsuperscript{64}

For example, in 2002, Australia revised its consent to ICJ and ITLOS jurisdiction to exclude disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, lest a possible claim be brought against it in those fora by East Timor.\textsuperscript{65} And in 2004, the United Kingdom altered its general consent


\textsuperscript{65} See Declaration [of Australia] Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice Concerning Australia’s Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Mar. 21, 2002, 2175 U.N.T.S. 494, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/5.html (amending its declaration to preclude “any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation”); Declaration [of Australia] Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Concerning the Application to Australia of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of that Convention, Mar. 21, 2002, 2177 U.N.T.S. 307, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/6.html (declaring that Australia “does not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the procedures referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations”). Australia was concerned that East Timor, upon gaining independence, would submit a dispute to the ICJ or ITLOS regarding sovereignty over the Timor Gap. See Gillian Triggs & Dean Bialek, Australia Withdraws Maritime Disputes from the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 17 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 423, 423 (2002).
to the jurisdiction of the ICJ so that a threatened case by Mauritius would not fall within the Court’s competence.66

B. Limitations on External Controls

External controls, from the look of them, are imposing, but upon closer examination they are less so. Aside from decision control (discussed further below), which works unilaterally and thus is not easily mediated, external controls require cooperation and coordination among States and therefore are more susceptible to frustration. As a consequence, there are two fundamental limitations on external controls over international courts: judicial independence and structural constraints inherent in the international system. These limits significantly undermine the efficacy of external controls over international courts.

As an initial matter, States have less control over judges than they do over other international civil servants because of judicial independence.67 Independence, here, means the freedom from coercion.68 Such independence means that States cannot direct judges to decide cases in certain ways, even if those judges are nationals of that State. Though the presumption of judicial independence may not have obtained for certain ICJ judges from totalitarian States during the Cold War,69 it must be assumed today. This is not to suggest, certainly, that judges are completely impartial, especially when they decide cases in which their State of nationality is a party, only that judges are free to decide cases in ac-

66. See Declaration of the United Kingdom Under Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute, July 5, 2004, 2271 U.N.T.S. 285 (altering the United Kingdom’s previous declaration so that the Court’s jurisdiction would henceforth cover only disputes arising after January 1, 1974 and those that are brought by States that are not and have never been a member of the Commonwealth). The United Kingdom was fearful that Mauritius would bring a case regarding the status of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean. See Nita Bhalla, Mauritius Stakes Claim for Chagos, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3583927.stm; Ewen MacAskill, Mauritius May Sue for Diego Garcia, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1255446,00.html.

67. See Steve Chamovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 219, 228 (Laurence Boisson de Chazourmes, Cesare P.R. Romano & Ruth Mackenzie eds., 2002) (noting that “judicial independence was recognized by the parties drafting the WTO”).


cordance with their views, which will necessarily reflect their back-
grounds. 70

That States take judicial independence seriously became evident dur-
ing the discussion in the Security Council of the completion strategies
for the ICTY and ICTR. 71 Some States worried that directing the ad hoc
courts to complete their missions by certain dates impermissibly di-
rected the courts, particularly their judges, to take certain positions.
France, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, made clear
its view that the completion strategies “should not be construed as un-
dermining the principle of independence of the two Tribunals and the
separation of their functions [from those of the Council].” 72 As a conse-
quence of the need and desire for judicial independence, it has been,
according to a UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, “ex-
tremely difficult for...the Tribunals’ parent organ, the Security Council,
to hold [them] strictly accountable.” 73

Aside from judicial independence, there are numerous structural con-
straints that limit the ability of States to control international courts.
There are three types: (1) multiple and collective principals constraints;
(2) monitoring constraints; and (3) competing nonlegal policy con-
straints.

Constraints on State control flow, in part, from the fact that interna-
tional courts have multiple and/or collective principals. Thus, even
when the control mechanism is centralized, such as through the Security
Council or an Assembly of States Parties, control is effectively miti-
gated by the inability of States to agree. This is especially evident with
rules control. Unlike in the United States and other developed legal sys-
tems, where judicial interpretations of statutory 74 and constitutional 75

70. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Bi-
ased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005).

71. As a formal matter, statutes of international courts state that judges are to be “independ-
et.” See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 2 (“The Court shall
be composed of a body of independent judges....”).

72. Letter Dated 30 March 2004 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United

73. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.

74. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (concluding that “Congress and its committees are
aware of the [Supreme] Court’s statutory decisions, devote significant efforts toward analyzing
their policy implications, and override those decisions with a frequency heretofore unreported”).

75. Four constitutional amendments have overturned Supreme Court decisions: the Eleventh
Amendment, overturning Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); the Fourteenth Amendment,
provisions can be and are overturned, States have great difficulty with re-legislating international law. This, as one commentator has written, is international law's "missing legislator" problem. Identical difficulties apply to revising a court's mandate.

For similar reasons, States cannot effectively control courts through appointments. Inter-State coordination of nominations and elections takes the form of horse-trading and not substantive review. And typically, judges are nominated and rotated on a geographical basis that has no connection ex ante with a judge's views or ex post with a judge's decisions. As Judge Thomas Buergenthal has recently written, "What struck me in my re-election campaign is how highly politicized the election process is for the various judicial positions that the UN membership has to vote for and how little judicial qualifications of the individual candidates or their judicial record seem to matter." Even the permanent five members of the Security Council, which traditionally have guaranteed seats on some international courts, seldom rotate their judges, even when there has been a change in government. Only in exceptional cases have substantive considerations mattered. Judges, therefore, have little concern that their decisions will affect their chances for reappointment or promotion, and this increases their independence while on the bench.


79. Thus, the majority of the UN General Assembly, unhappy with the ICI's judgment in the *South West Africa (Second Phase)* case, replaced the judges who voted on the "wrong" side. As a consequence, five years later the court's decision was essentially reversed in the *Namibia* case, reflecting a "change of attitude on the part of the Court." See Ram Prakash Anand, *Enhancing the Acceptability of Compulsory Procedures of International Dispute Resolution*, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 10 (2001); Edward McWhinney, *The International Court of Justice and International Law-Making: The Judicial Activism/Self-Restraint Antinomy*, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 3, 10-11 (2006).

80. See Karen J. Alter, *Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute Reso-
Monitoring constraints also mitigate effective control of international courts. In domestic systems, we rely upon a host of actors—the government, private parties (including practitioners and academics), and the media—to monitor and report on judicial activities. In the international system, such monitoring devices exist but are much more attenuated or non-functional. Thus, even though many (though not all) court sessions are open, decisions and opinions are public, and press releases are issued, the media report on only the most high-profile cases (such as that of Slobodan Milošević) and seldom with any insight. Further, even the most affluent of States cannot afford the resources to track every action of every court. With particularly active courts, such as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, it is especially difficult to read and analyze the plethora of documents produced. It is true that some States, including the United Kingdom and the United States, maintain very small staffs in The Hague and Geneva to, among other things, monitor and interact with the tribunals that sit there, but it is still next to impossible to digest everything. For the vast majority of States, it is impossible. Even the UN Security Council and General Assembly have difficulties. One might expect States to only truly pay careful attention to courts when they participate (or have a direct interest) in a proceeding—for example,
as a party or when subject to orders by a court.\textsuperscript{83} Much happens, therefore, in the absence of oversight.\textsuperscript{84}

But even if a few State officials can get a handle on what is going on, it is difficult for a State to react to judicial overreaching. This is not just a matter of bureaucracy; it is also a matter of competing policies. Legal policy is only one of any number of policies that make up a State’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{85} Thus, even if a State decides that an international tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or committed an error of law that would have a direct effect on that State’s international obligations, it is still possible that the State would take no corrective action because of other, competing policies. For instance, even if the United States took issue with a particular ruling of the ICTY, one might wonder whether it would attempt to take action against the ICTY because the United States is strongly supportive of that institution for foreign policy reasons. The same is true of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, though for different reasons. Thus, while the United States has disagreed fundamentally with a number of decisions of the Iran Tribunal,\textsuperscript{86} it has not withdrawn its consent to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (as it could) because doing so would potentially have repercussions in the sensitive bilateral relations between the two countries.

C. The Limits of External Controls: Inefficiency

In domestic systems, we have a structure of independent judges within a dependent judiciary.\textsuperscript{87} Individual judges are provided independence but the courts are kept in check by various intermediate control mechanisms—primarily re-legislating and re-allocation of jurisdiction. Though only occasionally used, such controls are effective because


\textsuperscript{84} See, e.g., Raab & Bevers, supra note 82, at 104 (noting how the ICTY’s “plea-bargaining and sentencing policy more broadly have developed in a rather haphazard manner without independent review”).


\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., Iran v. United States, Award No. 529-A15 (II:A and II:B)-FT, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. (May 6, 1992).

they can be wielded efficiently; hence, they act not only as correctives but as deterrents. When combined with internal controls, they can make for highly-developed systems of control.

The same cannot be said for international law, which is mostly a system of independent judges within independent courts. Because of the limitations on external control mechanisms peculiar to the international system, the optimal conditions for their effectiveness do not exist in practice, except in limited cases. Courts are most likely to be properly controlled when they are supervised by fewer principals, when there are opportunities for effective re-legislating, when they are newer, or when the stakes are extraordinarily high. Thus, both the NAFTA and the WTO contain mechanisms for judicial correction, but only in the case of the NAFTA (and not the 150-member WTO) have the three Parties agreed to correct a judicial decision. In most cases, international courts lack effective supervision because the effects of external mechanisms of control—the ones that are used so well in domestic systems—are mediated by the structural limitations of the international system and by the principle of judicial independence. As a consequence of the inefficiencies of external control mechanisms, international courts, as one commentator has said of the ICTY, largely look after themselves. 88

III. CAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS EXERT SELF-CONTROL?

Commentators focus on external controls on international courts, as if those were the only mechanisms that keep judges in check. 89 But as important, if not more important, are internal controls—those checks on the operation of the judiciary that are applied by judges to themselves. 90 In the absence of effective external checks, internal checks are particularly important because international judges are not simple agents applying the law disinterestedly, at least not always. International judges, like their domestic counterparts, have interests like anyone else. 91 These interests are both attitudinal—in the sense of being based

89. See, e.g., Danner, supra note 17; Ginsburg, supra note 17; Steinberg, supra note 17.
90. Cf Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 969 (1995) (“The hard features of our judicial system...largely are useful in a negative sense....They do not provide positive inducements to behave in a desirable manner....”).
91. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
on ideology or preferred public policy—and personal—in the sense of being based on ambition, respect, popularity, and other forms self-interest. Such interests can run against—and override—the external limits placed upon international courts and judges. Hence the need arises not only for effective external controls, but also for effective internal controls.

This Part looks at techniques of judicial self-control and their limits. It argues that while there are a number of internal control mechanisms that operate on international judges, these are, by their very nature, weak. On the other hand, international judges have strong interests of their own, and those interests are empowered by the inherent authorities of international courts.

A. Internal Controls on International Courts

Internal controls on international courts are both formal and informal. They can be divided into three categories of constraints: professional norms, judicial ego, and legal process. All three types of control are weak, but they do have their effects and they cannot be ignored.

Foremost, international judges are limited by the professional norms associated with their office, primarily independence and impartiality. Though such norms exist as a necessary consequence of a judge’s election, “for [a new] international judge to conduct himself in an impartial and independent way,” writes Judge Theodor Meron, “may require adaptation and discipline.” As part of this process, the statutes of most international courts require that judges, before they take their seats, make a solemn declaration that is designed to impart notions of impar-


92. Though some of the restrictions noted in this Section are (or might be considered) also “external” controls, I refer to them here insofar as they are applied by judges to themselves.


94. Meron, supra note 12, at 360.

95. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 20 (“Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously.”); Rome Statute of the Interna-
tiality and conscientiousness to the persons taking the oath—in other words to appeal to their “internal compass.” To bolster their effect, oaths are administered publicly. This is intended to suggest to the judge that he or she is publicly accountable in the event of a failure to abide by judicial norms of conduct. It is also intended to satisfy the audience that the judge will act in accordance with the norms expected of him or her. Professional norms thus act upon judges in two ways: as a reminder of agreed judicial standards and as a reminder of the possible consequences resulting from the failure to abide by those standards.

Judges also enjoy adulation and care about the prestige of their office, and this too might limit their actions. Judges might be concerned about their popularity with particular groups—such as members of the international bar, international law academics, and nongovernmental organizations—for reasons of ego (wanting to be respected), influence, and even monetary rewards (for example, by being appointed an arbitrator in international arbitrations). They might care about their reputation among their colleagues, both on their own court and on other international courts, also for reasons of ego and influence. In these and other ways, international judges have been said to be a part of a “global community of law” that restricts their decision-making. Finally, international judges care about whether their decisions will be complied with by States (both the parties to the case and non-parties) and whether States may withdraw their consent from the Court’s jurisdiction, and this may affect their decision-making too.

96. Cass, supra note 90, at 978.


100. Thus, in some circumstances, it appears that judges and arbitrators have issued decisions that were designed to avoid noncompliance by one of the parties to the dispute. See, e.g., United
Judges are restricted, as well, in a number of technical and procedural ways. As a formal matter, they are restricted by the jurisdictional and other limits imposed by States in a court's mandate. They are also limited by the texts of the agreements they apply, as well as by precedent and other sources of law, including interpretative rules.\footnote{This can be true, even though, as a formal matter, international judges are not bound by prior decisions. See, e.g., MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996).} The requirement that a court give reasoned, public opinions\footnote{See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 56(1) ("The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based."); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, art. 30(1) (same).} that are in accordance with law can also set limits to a judge's decision-making.\footnote{See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657–58 (1995).} And some courts, such as the international criminal tribunals and the WTO, include multi-judge panels and forms of appellate or quasi-appellate review in order to decrease the possibility of partiality and error.\footnote{Reasons can easily cover a self-interested decision. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998). On the failure of the International Court of Justice to give reasons in one case, see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005).}

B. Limitations on Internal Controls

There are, thus, a number of ways in which judges can constrain or are constrained by themselves. But there are a number of factors, some unique and some not unique to the international system, that work in favor of judicial discretion. Indeed, some of the internal constraints on judging can in fact cut in favor of activism, and other internal constraints, such as giving reasoned opinions, are not necessarily effective.\footnote{See, e.g., Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centrepiece: The WTO Appellate Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 289, 292–94 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006).} There are two general types of limits on internal controls: the personal and institutional interests of judges and the institutional authority of courts.
Like all judges, international judges have a variety of personal and institutional interests that overlap with or derive from their professional roles. They have views about public policy; they have opinions regarding the role of courts and judges; and they have concerns about their reputations and popularity.106 These interests cohere into a tendency, as Karen Alter has written, for judges to “promot[e] [judicial] independence, influence, and authority.”107 Thus, judges seek independence and autonomy from political bodies, and they seek to increase the relevance of their decisions.108 They also tend to advocate expanding the power of the law, as by doing so they also expand their own power.109

Given the structure of the international system, with its gaps, ambiguities, deficient legislative process, and weak enforcement mechanisms, these inclinations—and the opportunities to act on them—are even greater for international judges. As a result, international judges often believe in the “development of international law”110 or, as Judge Jennings put it, “the scientific development of general international law.”111 Knowing how difficult it is for States to fill the gaps, they see it as their responsibility to do so by putting their “imprimatur” on such development.112 Judge Jennings wrote approvingly, “It is probable that in view of the difficulties surrounding the codification of international law, international tribunals will in the future fulfill, inconspicuously but efficiently, a large part of the task of developing international law.”113 Judge Koroma, referring to this prediction, commented, “I believe that’s what we try to do.”114 Judge Simma of the International Court of Jus-

106. See generally BAUM, supra note 91.
108. See id. at 45–46.
112. Jennings, supra note 111, at 241.
tice, writing in two recent judgments, complained about the "inappropriate self-restraint" and the "unnecessarily cautious way[s]" of his colleagues and Judge ad hoc Shearer argued in an opinion that it was for the ITLOS to strike "[a] new ‘balance’" in the law since "circumstances have now changed." International judges are also believers in the power of international law and adjudication. The courts through their decisions can, some judges claim, "secur[e] the promotion of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations between States." Thus, like constitutional court judges, international court judges "seek both to preserve the normative superiority of [international law] and to ensure that [international law] becomes, or continues to be, the essential reference point for the settlement of like cases that may arise in the future." "

Courts and judges not only have their own interests; they also have their own authorities. They initially have (some) authority because it was given to them by States. But they have other kinds of authorities—indeed, of what State’s bestow upon them—by virtue of their expertise and the legitimacy inherent in their judicial role. International courts, therefore, have "the ability...to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others." That ability is based in their missions, their goals, and their methods, the ways in which they go about achieving those goals. With such abilities, international courts can use their authority to regulate current and future behavior by States and other actors. In so doing, they potentially can go beyond what States have delegated to them, as, once established, international courts have

Volker Röben eds., 2005).


118. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 141 (2000).


authorities independent of that delegation. These powers can be substantial, as the European Court of Justice’s construction of its own authority and its transformation of the EU legal system demonstrates.

C. The Limits of Internal Controls: Moral Hazard

Judicial independence acts like insurance, decreasing the risk to judges (the insured) of repercussions for their decisions on the bench. The advantages of insurance (and independence), though, can also have attendant costs, namely moral hazard, in which the insured’s behavior changes to such an extent that the associated risks and losses increase substantially because their costs no longer accrue to the insured. Thus, judicial independence (and the ineffectiveness of external controls generally) allows judges the freedom to pursue their own interests, subject only to internal controls.

And even more so than their domestic colleagues, international judges have interests that make them inherent judicial expansionists, as well as authorities that provide them the opportunities to implement those predilections. Believers in the power of law, international judges see it as their duty to use the courts to develop international law and to consolidate the international rule of law. Internal controls have their effects—judges feel compelled to decide cases under the law, as a matter of substance and process. But internal controls, which are naturally weak as they depend on self-control, can only counter these tendencies so much. Law, particularly international law, is malleable, and judges have great discretion. While international judges, of course, are not entirely free agents, they are hardly opinionless automatons either.

121. Especially when combined with the ability of courts to act incrementally over a long period of time. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or Stare Decisis?, 2 LAW TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965).


IV. COMPETITION AND CONTROL

States are not unaware of the importance and fragility of judicial control mechanisms. For example, during the Security Council debates on the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, some States put down markers for the new courts. Thus, the representative of Venezuela stated that the ICTY, "as a subsidiary organ of the Council, would not be empowered with—nor would the Council be assuming—the ability to set down norms of international law or to legislate with respect to those rights. It simply applies existing international humanitarian law." 124 And the representative of Argentina indicated that the ICTR "is not authorized to establish rules of international law or to legislate as regards such law but, rather, it is to apply existing international law." 125 This was also a concern of the drafters of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, who embedded in that agreement the rule that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the D[ispute] S[ettlement] B[ody] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." 126 And as we have seen, the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court went to great lengths to reduce judicial discretion by drafting detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes and all but eliminating judicial rule-making. As States have created more courts, and noticed the flaws of existing courts, they have become increasingly interested in controlling courts ab initio.

But, as the above analysis indicates, these attempts will ultimately be ineffectual. Like international organizations generally, 127 international courts have minds and interests of their own. As a result, they can be tempted to expand their powers beyond those provided for in their constitutive documents or by informal expectations. At the same time, international courts are protected from external control because of the

124. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (statement of Mr. Arria, representative of Venezuela). It is true that the ad hoc tribunals can create their own rules and that those rules influence the outcome of cases, but that does not mean that the Security Council delegated lawmaking authority to those courts.
127. See, e.g., BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 120 (discussing the autonomy and authority of secretariats of international organizations).
principle of judicial independence and because of structural constraints on international lawmakering and institutional reform. This combination of weak external control and imperfect self-control provides international courts with opportunities to exceed their mandates. Though the likelihood of this occurring varies by court (and even by case), there should be no doubt that international judges not only have the opportunity and the tools, but, on occasion, the willingness to do this as well.

Traditional mechanisms of control are imperfect because they fail to effectively act upon the needs of courts and judges to maintain their influence and authority. If judges have little reason to worry about external controls—that their decisions will affect their chances for reelection; that their rulings will be overturned legislatively; that their mandates will not operate perpetually; that their rulings will not diminish the number of cases on their docket—then they have little incentive to check their own actions. This is why those who are troubled by the breakdown of control have often looked to internal controls, suggesting that international judges be better attuned to their unique roles and exert greater self-control. Yet, as these same commentators acknowledge, self-control is a weak hook upon which to hang international dispute resolution. What is needed are controls that are tailored to and take advantage of the structure of the international system as it exists today and the various intersecting incentives and capacities created by that structure.

Because of the strong judicial desire to have a positive role in the international legal order, the most effective controls on judges, therefore, will play on that need. And the best way to do that is by restricting, or threatening to restrict, the main vehicle for judicial influence: cases. In other words, international judges are most likely to exert self-control if


129. See, e.g., REISMAN, supra note 7, at 11–45 (describing the breakdown of informal jurisdictional limits at the ICJ); Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US-Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 196, 196 (2006) (concluding that, in a recent case, “the Appellate Body inappropriately expanded the WTO’s authority to hear facial challenges”).

they can envision harms to their core self-interests by failing to do so. A system of competitive adjudication provides such a mechanism.

A. Competitive Adjudication

Which brings us back to consent and decision control. The easiest and most effective way for States to control courts is to limit their ability to decide cases, by actions taken either ex ante or ex post. This is usually viewed negatively, as States opting out of the international legal system. But there is potentially a positive side to decision control, too, for a State’s refusal to consent to a court’s jurisdiction or a State’s withdrawal from that jurisdiction communicates to the court that that State is unsatisfied with the quality of the court’s work. 131 States have an interest, among other things, 132 in finding courts that provide them with “unbiased, accurate, reasonable, and prompt resolution of disputes,” 133 and failing that, they can and sometimes do withdraw. If enough States (or important enough States) did this, then a court might lose its customer base, and without customers, a court could slide into irrelevance and maybe even shut down. Though international judges are not as dependent on litigants as pre-nineteenth-century English judges, whose salaries were based on the fees they received, they will still be solicitous of the needs of States, except in certain circumstances (noted below), in order to maintain their standing, prestige, and influence in the international legal order. 134 Faced with losing market share (and its potential consequences) because States withdraw from or refuse to accede to their jurisdiction, courts—like any supplier of goods and services—will look to reinvent themselves as more customer-friendly. 135

This process of evaluation and re-evaluation is enhanced when a State has multiple fora to choose from when submitting a dispute to ad-

131. I leave aside here the issue of noncompliance.
132. Of course, litigants usually seek out a forum that will be biased in their favor; hence, forum shopping. But where litigants do not have free choice of fora, that is, when the forum depends on a mutual choice of plaintiff and defendant, as in the international arena, the interests of the parties shift to these more neutral criteria. For a general discussion of factors States might consider, see Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 246–65 (2004).
133. Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1585.
135. Cf. Cooter, supra note 134, at 107 ("[S]ome private judges have to attract business, so they are exposed to the same market pressures as anyone who sells a service.").
judication. The ability of States to choose among courts or to forego them entirely and the desire of courts to adjudicate cases and adjust their procedures to attract litigants together generate the incentives and dynamics for competitive adjudication. Courts will endeavor to make rules—both procedural and substantive—that accord with the interests of States, and courts will monitor the decisions of their competitors (and how they are received) in order to decide whether to adopt those innovations themselves. In this way, competition among courts can create effective control. 136

The market for international legal services can serve as an effective control mechanism not only because it creates incentives for courts to mediate their actions in order to attract litigants, but also because the system, as constructed, does not establish a bias in favor of a particular set of litigants, plaintiffs or defendants. 137 The dangers of forum shopping are, therefore, diminished considerably. Not all competitive systems are so evenhanded. In the United States, for example, state long-arm statutes and choice-of-law rules allow plaintiffs in class-action tort litigation to unilaterally choose their forum, and elected state judiciaries have incentives to favor these plaintiffs, thereby creating a pro-plaintiff bias in certain jurisdictions. 138 In the international system, plaintiffs do not have this choice, as the consent of both parties is required as a basis for jurisdiction, and plaintiffs must choose their forum with the foreknowledge that they may be subject to the same rules as a potential future defendant. Thus, as with arbitrators in international commercial arbitration, international judges “have strong incentives to make decisions that make both parties to the case, ex ante, better off.” 139

In some ways, international dispute resolution has always been a competitive system. States had their choice of fora, whether it was the

136. Ruth Wedgwood has suggested a system of “competitive multilateralism” that would lead to reform of international organizations, such as the United Nations. See Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial, Give the United Nations a Little Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at A23.


139. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 107 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Cooter, supra note 134, at 131 (“Private judges who maximize demand for their services from disputants, each of whom has the power to veto choice of a judge, will make decisions which are pairwise Pareto efficient…”).
ICJ (or its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice) or ad hoc arbitral tribunals. Sometimes, because of the nature of the dispute, only one forum—permanent or ad hoc—was available. But mostly States had their pick and opted for the forum that best suited their needs.140 Thus, for example, States have variously resorted to the ICJ and ad hoc arbitration to resolve their maritime boundary disputes.141 That said, the proliferation of courts, principally over the past fifteen years, has expanded the possibilities for competition significantly. Ad hoc tribunals are fine, but, in the end, competition is enhanced by more permanent institutions because permanent judges—given the length of their tenure and the permanency of their courts—have greater incentives to maintain their status positions and influences than do arbitrators and because more permanent courts create a greater range of choices for litigants.

Competition has also increased because of a proliferation of treaties that institutionalize a framework of competitive adjudication.142 The best example of such entrenched competition is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 287 of UNCLOS provides for compulsory dispute settlement of certain disputes but allows parties to the Convention to choose between four different types of dispute resolution: the ITLOS, the ICJ, and two types of arbitration.143 The default (in cases where a State has not chosen a preferred forum ex

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140. On why States may prefer arbitration over adjudication, see Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go to Arbitration Rather Than Adjudication, 5 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 133 (2006).
141. See Charney, supra note 28, at 315.
143. See UNCLOS, supra note 142, art. 287.
ante or where States have not consented to the same forum) is to one of
the two forms of arbitration. 144 Because States can alter their dispute
resolution choice at any time prior to a dispute or can agree ad hoc to
one of the four dispute resolution mechanisms, the Convention imbeds
competition. 145 This system of choice was established because the States
negotiating the Convention could not agree upon a single method of ad-
judication, 146 and the resulting approach makes it more likely that States
that are considering ratifying the Convention will not be put off by the
Convention’s compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. 147 As a result
of this competition, States may forum shop and tribunals may seek to
make themselves more amenable to perceived State preferences. 148

Competition among tribunals is not purely theoretical. Alain Pellet,
who has appeared many times as counsel before the ICJ and other inter-
national tribunals, noted recently that “[p]arties have the impression that
the political, financial and human efforts involved in their consent to
bring a case to the World Court are not compensated and they therefore
turn toward other fora, which are perhaps less prestigious, but just as ef-
fective.” 149 And the impact of this competitive framework is already
evident in the acts of courts and in the public statements of judges.
Older institutions have updated their rules to make them more user-
friendly. 150 And the practices or powers of one court—such as the au-

144. See id. art. 287(5).
145. See Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
146. See 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
41–45 (Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B. Sohn eds., 1989); NATALIE KLEIN,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 54 (2005); Shabtai
Rosenne, UNCLOS III—The Montreux (Riphagen) Compromise, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF WILLEM RIPHAGEN 169 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo
Siblesz eds., 1986).
147. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement
148. See, e.g., Donald L. Morgan, Implications of the Proliferation of International Legal
(explaining why ITLOS’s procedural practices, such as expediency, and interpretations of sub-
stantive law, such as the precautionary principle, might make it an attractive forum for certain
States).
149. Alain Pellet, Remarks on Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice, 5 LAW
150. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&p3=0; International Court of Justice, Practice Direc-
tions, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0; Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration, Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/2STATENG.pdf; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbi-
tority to issue binding provisional measures and the use of law clerks—are being reviewed, adopted, and sought by other courts in the hope that incorporating those techniques will make them more attractive to potential litigants (or at least as attractive as their competitors). As Rosalyn Higgins, current President of the International Court of Justice, has written, the "important task for the Court is...to ensure that it can respond as efficaciously as possible to its clientele." In these ways, international tribunals are beginning to act like much like the providers of private international dispute resolution.

B. Limitations on Competitive Adjudication

Competitive adjudication works, though, only if judges feel the need to compete. Consequently, when courts are guaranteed sufficient business (that is, when courts have exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction and when States have no option but to accede to that jurisdiction), they will not yield to the pressures of competition. This is the problem of judicial monopoly. For example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has compulsory jurisdiction over the member states of the Council of Europe (COE) for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. The only mechanism of exit from the Court’s jurisdiction is withdrawal from the COE, which is not a desirable option for most States. Consequently, the ECHR has no effective competition.
So, too, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which—in the wake of two recent efforts by Member States to adjudicate claims by ad hoc arbitration—declared last year that it had, by virtue of Article 292 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 157 “exclusive jurisdiction...in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States concerning the interpretation and application of Community law.” 158 EU Member States are therefore prohibited from bringing disputes to courts and tribunals other than the ECJ when a question of European law is at issue (and the Court has given a wide interpretation of what constitutes European law). In monopolistic systems, such as these and others, 159 competitive adjudication will not succeed, and so the only way to effectively control such courts is through the re-writing of the rules (or the threat of re-writing the rules) or noncompliance (or the threat of noncompliance). 160

Similarly, competition will also fail if a court is captured by a group of States who, amongst themselves, provide the court with the necessary business to maintain its docket. This is the problem of monopsony. 161

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161. A related phenomenon is oligopsony, in which the number of buyers (here States or groups of States consenting to the jurisdiction of international courts) is too few to sustain a com-
Indeed, it has been suggested that, at least since the 1980s, the International Court of Justice has been captured by a group of States. Finally, competition will fail if there is collusion among the suppliers of international adjudication—international courts—which would establish, in effect, a monopolistic system.

C. The Limits of Competitive Adjudication: Market Failure

Competitive adjudication will work, therefore, only when competitive conditions obtain. In cases of monopoly, monopsony, or collusion, control will be difficult to achieve through competition, and market failure will result. Judicial monopolies may be appropriate in domestic systems and in highly integrated regional systems, such as Europe, where controls may be more effectively wielded. But forms of judicial monopolies will impair the possibilities for international judicial dispute resolution because they hamper the control that comes with competition among courts.

How then should market failure be combated? How should competition among international courts be facilitated? In domestic systems, monopolistic tendencies in business are controlled either through antitrust laws or, in the case of natural monopolies (such as public utilities), price regulation. For international adjudication, the equivalent of price regulations are external controls, such as detailed rule-making—the inherent difficulties of which we have already noted. But there are other techniques—akin to antitrust law—to entrench competition among courts, and these are discussed below.

V. CONCLUSION: COHERENCE AND COMPETITION

The international system needs more not fewer mechanisms for dispute resolution. Consequently, when judicial controls have broken down or are ineffective, there is the need to repair them. Like all types of reform, control regeneration is difficult but not inconceivable. In the competitive market.

162. See Reisman, supra note 7, at 44.

163. Though, of course, even in some domestic systems judicial competition does exist, for example, among U.S. bankruptcy jurisdictions and (possibly) among the state courts for corporate litigation. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 138 (evaluating the benefits of competition among bankruptcy courts). But see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 708–15 (2002) (providing a skeptical account of judicial competition for corporate cases).
text of international courts, control reform must take into account judicial independence and, to be effective, must also be sensitive to the structural constraints inherent in the international system. Competition accomplishes this by ensuring that the needs of courts and their judges are linked with the needs of States. Competition is not only an innocuous means of control; it is also a valuable technique for the creation of better rules and more efficient courts.

Many have worried, though, that competition (and conflicts) among courts will lead to incoherence and unpredictability in the law and that will undermine the authority of the international legal system, which, so it is feared, is already short on credibility. Jurisdictional overlap, in the words of one commentator, “causes a host of problems such as legal uncertainty for the parties, endless proceedings through forum-shopping and re-litigation of the same dispute before different courts and tribunals, creation of ‘self-contained’ regimes, fragmentation of international law, and, ultimately, deterioration of the authority of dispute settlement mechanisms.” If we care about international courts and international law, the argument goes, we should do what we can to reduce, if not eliminate, conflict among courts.

Those who worry about incoherence propose two types of mechanisms to resolve such conflicts. The first imagines a hierarchical judicial system, such as by making the ICJ a court of appeal, giving the ICJ the authority to render preliminary rulings (modeled on the ECJ), extending the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction, or creating a Tribunal des Conflicts (modeled on the French system for resolving disputes between the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation). This is highly unlikely to occur. The second is based on judicial comity, res judicata, lis pendens, and other “system-protective doctrines” to be created and implemented by judges. Because “there is no central judicial authority [in interna-

167. See SHANY, supra note 29, at 278; Lavranos, supra note 165, at 245–46; Martinez, supra note 29, at 448; August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Proce-
tional law] which can impose order over the entire field so as to secure unity in the overall development of the law,” Judge Shahabuddeen has written, “there is a legal duty [on judges] to take account of the need for coherence in the whole field.”168 Such judicial “self-organizing,” it is claimed, “is almost certainly a necessary precondition” of “an international judicial system that functions well in all situations.”169

But coherence, predictability, and order, though certainly desirable, prioritize style over substance, form over outcome.170 Most importantly, coherence presupposes a legal system that contains adequate control mechanisms. Without adequate control mechanisms, however, a well-regulated system will not be a well-subscribed system. Coherence is a luxury afforded to us by control.

Further, competition and coherence are not necessarily in tension. It is entirely possible that, after an initial period of competition in a particular substantive area, coherent rules will emerge,171 and, indeed, this has been the case in some areas of law.172 When coherent rules have not emerged—such as with the law of State responsibility for the acts of irregular forces173—it may be due, in fact, to the absence of effective competition.

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169. Martinez, supra note 29, at 448. This is an empirical assertion, which is belied by the historical record of competitive systems of adjudication and the existence in contemporary society of forms of competition among courts. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 138.

170. Some may also oppose competition precisely because it places limits on the autonomy of the international judiciary. On this theory, autonomous courts are desirable because they more effectively promote the international rule of law. This view is misplaced because it assumes that States will sign up for such courts. A corollary fear is that competition among courts will lead to a race to the bottom. But that is unlikely as that would undercut the usefulness of international adjudication to States and also because, as discussed previously, international judges are, on the whole, part of a culture that would resist such tendencies.


172. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 28, at 345.

Finally, critics of competition confuse competition among courts to attract litigants (competitive adjudication) with conflicts among courts that may stem from multiple filings in different courts regarding the same dispute (parallel proceedings). It may be appropriate to restrict parties to a dispute to a single filing in one jurisdiction, and consequently, it may be appropriate for courts to defer to another jurisdiction where a case has already been filed. Indeed, treaties that allow for competitive adjudication usually also limit parties to a single filing in one forum. Thus, the potential problem of overlapping jurisdiction over the same case is not a necessary result of (and consequently is not a valid objection to) competitive adjudication.

If competition is the priority, then States and courts should think less about “system-protective” devices and more about competition-enhancing techniques. In negotiating treaties, States should incorporate dispute resolution provisions, like those in the UNCLOS, that provide a choice of fora or create new fora. They should also publicly communicate their dissatisfaction with judicial decisions more often, as the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State did following a recent ICJ judgment. As Judge Meron has written: “Constructive criticism facilitates self-examination and self-improvement by the judiciary.” Courts, for their part, should adopt doctrines that mediate the precedential effects of their own decisions and encourage the publication of dissenting opinions. They should also critically review and take into account the decisions and practices of other courts. Indeed, instead of striving for uniformity, we should accept and develop a system of competitive adjudication in international law.

175. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 48, art. 2005(6).
177. Meron, supra note 12, at 368.