For this issue of the Review, the editors invited me to reflection. In response, I wish to consider some aspects of a problem that has bothered me over the past quarter-century. This problem arises from radical subjectivism and its effect on the legal order. I believe that something is radically subjective in law when one norm is considered as valid as any other, or when one perception of facts is thought as valid as any other, for the reason that any objective principles for determining validity are either inadequate or considered meaningless tautologies, masking the subjective preference of those with power to invoke them in decision. The legal process then is simply a name for containing contradictions and intractable conflict, a form of denial of chaos to keep us secure in the illusion of an orderly universe.
Christenson, Gordon A., "Uncertainty in Law and Its Negation: Reflections" (1985). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. 167.