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In this review, by concentrating on the general aim of Dworkin's book, I hope to contribute to the discussion this book is sure to generate. What does the "moral reading" of our Constitution amount to, and what alternative do we have to endorsing such a reading? I ask these questions from what I would call a jurisprudential
perspective. For, while I do teach Jurisprudence, I do not teach Constitutional Law, other than some constitutional law themes that find their way into my Property and Wills & Trusts courses. Accordingly, I am not well placed to review the details or
the nuances of developments after Roe v. Wade,2 or the progeny spawned by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 two cases that dominate Parts I and II, respectively, of the book. But this personal limitation leaves me room perhaps for a more considered review of Dworkin's main thrust in this book, which is directed toward making
his view of the Constitution credible, or palatable, to his reader. Dworkin's theory of how to read the Constitution is, after all, central to his argument.